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TALKING THE
GOOD LIFE: FROM

FREE SPEECH TO
DEMOCRATIC
DIALOGUE
By

Allan

C.

Hir y bydd y mud ym mhorth y bddar **
- WELSH PROVERB
Any legal or political theory is a theory about 'the
good life'. It is nonsensical to talk of law or politics
outside of a social context, or to discuss a social framework separate from its laws or politics. Law, politics and
societies are inextricably linked; each helps to define and
constitute the others. By striving to provide an account of
the terms and conditions of collective and individual life
in a social group, the legal or political theorist cannot
avoid the abiding and central conundra of human existence - What is the proper and best way to live? How
are we to live together? Any legal or political theory
worth its normative salt addresses these questions directly
and attempts to offer cogent answers. Consequently, a
primary and inescapable issue for political and legal theory is not whether an idea of 'the good life' is relevant to
the theoretical project, but what that idea is to consist of,
and what weight it is to have in thinking about and criticizing legal and political practice.
In spite of their traditional denials to the contrary,
even liberals are engaged in the enterprise of formulating
and defending a viable conception of 'the good life'. It is
not so much that liberalism operates without a substantive theory, but that it depends on an implicit understanding that communal well being is best achieved and
* Allan C. Hutchinson is a professor at Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto. Earlier versions of this essay
were presented at seminars at the Universities of Boston, Toronto, Windsor and York. Along with'their participants, I am
grateful for helpful comments from Cindy Giacanova, Richard
Devlin, Corinne Doan, Owen Fiss, Arnie Herschorn, Patrick
Monahan, Jennifer Nedelsky, Andrew Petter, Evan Siddal and
Anne Werker.
** "The dumb will wait a long time at the door of the
deaf."

Hutchinson*
preserved through the protection of individual rights. For
some modern liberals, the attempt to define liberalism
through its opposition to community-based theories of
law and politics is ill-advised. This strategy contributes to
liberalism's perceived moral indifference and weakens its
political appeal.1 John Rawls, for instance, has recently
suggested that "the right and the good are complementary and the priority of right does not deny this." 2 Similarly, Ronald Dworkin has begun to make an explicit defense of liberalism as "a special form of community." '
Yet, this resort to the vocabulary of social solidarity does
not represent any fundamental change in the liberal theory of politics; the packing may have altered, but the
package remains the same. At best, modern liberalism
adopts a very 'thin' idea of community; the concern with
individual autonomy still overrides any obligation to secure the common good.
In this essay, I want to make a small start to a much
larger project. It is a task that attracts and frustrates
that radical branch of contemporary scholarship which is
devoted to the cause of social liberation - the development and defense of a critical theory and transformative
program that can effect a shift from the reneged promise
of liberal democracy to the untried possibilities of socialist democracy.' The central challenge is to wrest theory
and practice from the grip of a paralysing liberalism

I. See Galston, Defending Liberalism, 76 AM. POL. ScI.
621 (1982).
2. J. Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,
17 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 251, 252 (1988).
3. R. Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 188 and, generally, 195-216
(1986).
4. I have tried to develop the rudimentary deconstructive
and reconstructive tools for making a beginning to this project
in my earlier work. See A. Hutchinson, DWELLING ON THE
REV.

THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT

(1988).
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without falling into the embrace of a suffocating communitarianism. There are very real problems with how the
shared norms of civic virtue can operate as discriminatory principles of inclusion and exclusion. The complete
abandonment of individual rights could easily leave those
disfavored by the community without any protections.
Any meaningful reconstruction of 'the good life' must go
beyond the personal indifference of liberal politics, but
not as far as the public saturation of communitarianism;
privacy must be more than abandonment and individuality must be more than eccentricity.
I intend to examine the circumstances, causes and
consequences of the liberals' half hearted appeal to communitarian rhetoric. To focus and concretize this initial
enquiry, I will concentrate on how it might be possible to
transform the practice and theory of 'free speech' in line
with a more democratic vision of social justice. The idea
of a commitment to dialogue is an attempt to bridge the
gap between liberal rights talk and strict communitarianism. In short I want to propose a way to move from liberal chatter to democratic conversation in the service of a
participatory and empowering politics.
I.

FREEING SPEECH

In recent years, a number of scholars have abandoned
the liberal paradigm of legal and political theory and
have seized on the idea of 'community' as a constitutive
and regulative ideal.' These communitarian critics are
challenging liberals at all levels of inquiry and justification - metaphysical, normative and practical. They
combine to reject the core values and assumptions of the
liberal credo: the primacy of private over public virtues;
the celebration of the independent individual as the
source and standard of normative worth; and the collectivity's neutrality between competing conceptions of 'the
good life'.' By contrast to liberals, communitarians emphasize civic virtue over universal rights, situated citizens
over abstract individuals, and public connectedness over
personal autonomy. They do not seek to reconcile the different interests of private persons, but to transcend them
in the search for civic unity through a virtuous public
life. Self-interest is juxtaposed to communal virtue and
the locus of moral authority moves from the subjective
life to the republican polity itself; the modernist individual is replaced by the mature citizen. Instead of collapsing the barrier between public and private life, communitarians envision the public sphere as the nursery for
private action and responsibility.
Although communitarianism provides the theoretical
framework needed for a discussion of 'the good life',
there are very real risks that in practice its insistence on
shared values may overwhelm differences among citizens.
Neither responsible liberalism nor strict communitarian5. See, for example, M. Sandel, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); A. Maclntyre, AFTER VIRTUE (2nd ed
1986) and WHOSE RATIONALITY? (1988); and C. Taylor, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1985).
6. See, for example, J. Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 44652 (1971); R. Dworkin, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204
(1985); and B. Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 3-30 (1980).

ism provides a viable theoretical framework for transforming and reconstituting reality: liberalism protects abstract rights of individuals without regard to the quality
of those rights or their exercise; communitarianism focuses on the substance of community values without sufficient concern for the individual's role in the community.
Under liberalism, freedom requires each person to be a
conscript in a continual state of social war. Under communitarianism, virtue can become an enforced solidarity
in which failure to identify completely with others is
treated as an insurgent act of civic treason. A viable alternative of political thinking and practice must steer
clear of the extremes of liberalism and communitarianism by recognizing that the self is neither absolutely opposed to community nor completely determined by community. A theory of Democratic dialogism can reconcile
the tension between the extremes by recognizing that social life "consists of connectedness and autonomy, love
and hate, toleration of others and 7anger at their differfrom an ever-changing 'us'."
ences
In order to clarify this general discussion, I will
situate my critique of liberalism and exploration of dialogic
democracy in the contested terrain of 'free speech'. The
debate over free speech is the most heated and intense on
the academic and political agenda. The topical problems
of pornography, hate literature, election-campaign financing, commercial advertising and freedom of information attest not only to the importance of these exchanges,
but also to the confusion and indirection of the reigning
political theory. Like moths drawn to the light, legal theorists have been irresistibly attracted to the bright beacon
of free speech. The challenge and ambition is as worthy
as it is important - to suffuse and enhance the practices
and possibilities of social and political life. However, like
their lepidopteran counterparts, most writers on free
speech have found its attraction to be fatal. Despite a
plethora of different approaches, they have failed to solve
its mysteries or harness its potential.
I intend to concentrate on the very recent work of one
theorist, Owen Fiss of Yale Law School. I choose him for
two reasons. Apart from deflecting the usual charges of
attacking a strawperson, I think that Fiss' writings are
some of the most sophisticated and progressive in the
contemporary liberal canon. Also, they evince the limits
of the traditional ways of thinking about language, freedom, the individual and the state. In two recent essays,
Fiss maintains that the Free Speech Tradition is unsuited
to the conditions of the contemporary world.' In particular, he claims that the Tradition can no longer deliver on
its central promise "to further democracy by protecting
collective self-determination." 9 Fiss recognizes that the
threat to free speech comes as much from large private
corporations as it does from public agencies. Accordingly,
he recommends a more active role for the state in corn7. M. Tushnet, RED, WHITE AND BLUE:
YSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318 (1988).

A

CRITICAL ANAL-

8. Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) (herein-

after referred to as "State"), and Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) (hereinafter referred
to as "Speech").
9. State, id. at 784.
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bating this threat and in engendering the quality of public debate that is so vital to the practice and preservation
of democratic politics; he asks not whether the state has a
role to play, but what that role should be. In this regard,
Fiss' work deserves commendation and support. However,
although he provides a convincing explanation of why the
state should and must be involved in actively nurturing
free speech, he fails to offer any plausible or convincing
account of how the state can or should perform that task.
In reaching this impasse, Fiss' thought beautifully
captures the plight of modern liberalism. Although he
recognizes the democratic failure of modern politics and
U.S. constitutional doctrine, 0 his ideological commitments prevent him from following through on his critique
and developing a constructive program for democratic renewal. His vision is limited by an impoverished notion of
the state and its relation to the citizenry and by his refusal to generate any substantive visions of the social
good. Disenchanted with the neutrality of classical Lockean liberalism, Fiss, like many modern liberals, craves a
more socially sensitive set of political principles that can
recognize the social inequalities of contemporary society
and the mutual dependence of people. But, unwilling to
relinquish entirely his commitment to the core values of
the liberal credo -- the primacy of private over public virtues, the celebration of the individual as the source and
standard of normative worth and the collectivity's neutrality between competing conceptions of the good - he
can only make expedient and temporary resort to the programs and principles of a more truly civic and progressive politics. In short, Fiss cannot get to his intended
democratic destination from his liberal starting-place.
After summarizing Fiss' approach to free speech and
its informing values, I will demonstrate its limited efficacy and suggest a commitment to dialogue as an alternative way of thinking about free speech and achieving a
truly democratic politics. Throughout the essay, my aim
is to understand better the present so as to make attempts at transformation more informed and viable;
"how little do we know that which we are,/ How less
what we may be."'" A commitment to dialogic democracy provides both a substantive goal and an institutional
agent for social transformation. The practical worth of
social discourse in democratic politics intimately shapes
the possibilities of equal participation by persons in that
discourse. Dialogic democracy is a matter of both the
quality and quantity of speech. Furthermore, to consider
the practical applications of this dialogic approach, I will
offer a brief and preliminary analysis of 'commercial
speech'. The limited aim of that inquiry is to show that
there are convincing and concrete recommendations en10. Although Fiss is only concerned with United States law
and practice, his work is directly relevant to the Canadian predicament. The democratic failures of Canadian politics are
structurally similar and, since 1982, Canada has an entrenched
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Intoxicated by their newfound constitutional power of judicial review, Canadian courts
seem intent on following their U.S. cousins in elaborating a constitutional doctrine of 'free speech'. While the door is not fully
closed on the possibility of Charter-ing a different course, the
openings for such a deviation are already very narrow and unpropitious. See note 31, and section VII on Commercial Speech.
11. Lord Byron, Don Juan, c. xv, st. 99 (1824).

tailed and required by the general theory that I propose.
The gap between the feminist critique of Dale Spender
and the management of shopping centers 2 or the semiotic reflections of Umberto Eco and the production of television advertising"8 can be bridged by the dialogic theory itself.
II. THE FISS TRADITION
"Startled" by several major decisions of the Burger
Court, "4' Fiss is concerned with the all-too-cozy relation
between politics and economics; franchise and finance are
becoming increasingly mutually-dependent and reinforcing. The libertarian Tradition was developed to act as a
citizen's shield against the slings and arrows of state censorship, especially those which were targeted at the content of certain speech. Yet, in a modern hi-tech world in
which the paradigmatic speaker is CBS rather than the
street corner orator, continued reliance on that outmoded
Tradition will not only fail to protect democratic politics,
but "might even become destructive of that goal."'

5

Each

citizen's medieval shield of rights offers little defense
against modern communication technology. The journey

Only by recognizing the need to nourish
a genuine experience of shared commitments and mutual understandings the very antithesis of liberal values could Fiss make good on his critical
promise to enrich the quality of public
debate.
from the soapbox to the V.C.R. has altered both the
threat to, and the effectiveness of speech.
In place of the Free Speech Tradition, Fiss advocates
and defends a more interventionist role for the state. By
focusing more on the structure of social arrangements
than on the action of particular individuals, he wants to
shift critical attention away from "the frustration of
would-be speakers" and towards "the quality of public
discourse."' 6 Within such a structural scheme, the government would cease to be the worst enemy of free
speech, but would become, at least on occasion, its best
friend. Instead of leaving politics to the capital caprices
of a market economy, Fiss would permit and sometimes
require the state to correct and chastise it; the market

12. See D. Spender, MAN-MADE LANGUAGE (1985).
13. See U. Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1984).
14. Speech at 1407 (cited in note 8). See Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Miami Herald Publishing v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); and First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
15..Speech at 1410 (cited in note 8).
16. State at 786 (cited in note 8).
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would become the butler of democracy and not its
master. Instead of allowing the invisible hand of the market to orchestrate the social symphony (cacophony?), the
democratic arm of the state would assume the communal
baton. The denial of expressive autonomy to the loud few
would be adequately compensated by the broader benefits to the presently silenced many. In short, Fiss challenges the U.S. Supreme Court's standard view that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.""7
The pressing problem for Fiss is to explain and justify
under what circumstances the state is obliged or entitled
to regulate the activities of particular speakers. For Fiss'
theory to be effective, he would have to adopt a substantive criteria by which the state could measure the quality
of speech. Although he is tempted by the possibility of
formulating a thick description of what amounts to 'public debate' of sufficient democratic quality, he ultimately
resists and opts for a less radical approach; "[sluch a.
substantive baseline makes life easier but it is not essential."18 In effect, Fiss wants to keep his liberal cake and
eat it too. Although he accepts the need to be less doctrinaire in his commitment to the liberal faith, he still believes that a truly democratic polity can be achieved
through and not in spite of liberal values:

mains at the heart of Fiss' understanding of social life.
For Fiss, talking about the possibility of a private self
that stands, in some essential and constitutive sense, independent of its social and historical circumstances is both
achievable and desirable. Indeed, it is the chief idea that
gives meaning and point to the liberal project.
.Although. Fiss clearly sees the ideological constraints
and individualistic shortcomings of liberalism, he is unwilling or unable to do anything about them. No amount
of tinkering will suffice in this undertaking for it is the
very liberal structure of social practice and organization
that prevents a successful resolution of the free speech
problem. Fiss' unwillingness to break from this structure
is not surprising; democracy has always been optional to
a liberal scheme of governance rather than its pre-condition and raison d'&treY0 Each person is primarily a
rights-holder; their identity as members of a social group
and as citizens in a common democratic enterprise is secondary. Only by recognizing the need to nourish a genuine experience of shared commitments and mutual under-

Nothing I have said is meant to destroy the distinction presupposed by classical liberalism between
state and citizen, or between the public and private.
Rather, in asking that we shift our focus from the
street corner orator to CBS, I mean to suggest that
we are not dealing with hermetically sealed spheres.

III. A PUBLIC PROBLEM
The villain of the liberal piece is the cherished and
foundational distinction between public and private. To
preserve and perpetuate this dichotomy liberalism conceptualizes a pseudo-Blackstonian set of individual rights.
A constitutional injustice occurs when the state, or someone acting through or on behalf of the government, interferes with or fails to protect such entitlements. The emphasis is upon whether the impugned act can be
identified with the formal attributes of governmental authority and not upon whether it has actually inhibited or
damaged the interests of particular citizens. In fact, there
is little concern for the actual quality of those rights and
their exercise. Instead, the courts engage in an analytical
inquiry as to whether the government was the source of
the interference. If the government was involved, remedial intervention through the courts is warranted; if not,

CBS is

. .

. a composite of the public and private.

The same is true of the print media, as it is of all
corporations, unions, universities, and political organizations. Today the social world is largely constituted by entities that partake of both the public and
private.
A shift from the street corner orator to CBS
compels us to recognize the hybrid character of major social institutions; it begins to break down some
of the dichotomies between public and private presupposed by classical liberalism. 9
In this statement, Fiss reveals the limits and failings of
the liberal vision of democratic politics. It lacks an adequate social theory; it fails to acknowledge or understand
the extent to which individuals are deeply shaped by and
.interconnected with their social milieu. Although the
boundaries are less analytically sharp and more historically permeable than in traditional liberal thought, the
distinction between the public and private spheres re17. Buckley at 48-49 (cited in note 14). Fiss' suggestion
that "state regulation of speech is consistent with, and may
even be required by, the first amendment" is surely a strategic
rather than an historical claim. State at 783 (cited in note 8)
(emphasis added).
18. Speech at 1412 (cited in note 8).
19. Id. at 1414 (emphasis added).

standings -

the very antithesis of liberal values -

could

Fiss make good on his critical promise to enrich the quality of public debate. Paradoxically, it would seem that
Fiss must abandon liberalism if he wants to meet successfully the modern challenge that liberalism has set for
itself.

those affected must lobby for political reparations. Pedi-

gree and form' are the standards for evaluating impermissible behavior rather than effect and substance. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it in 1982, "careful adherence
to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and
federal judicial power ...[and] whether this is good or

bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political
order. '' "l

20. See Hutchinson and Monahan, Democracy and The
Rule of Law, in A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan eds., THE
97 (1987).
21. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37
(1982).
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY
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The first critical thing to note is that the public-private distinction is false because government is implicated
in all activity that occurs within its territorial jurisdiction. As sovereign, the government is as responsible for
its active decisions not to intervene and regulate as it is
for its decisions to act affirmatively. Although we perceive only the government's efforts to change the status
quo as state action, the retention of an existing situation
is also due to the efforts and actions of the state. Acquiescence and action are merely flip-sides of the governmental coin." The protection of private property and the
enforcement of private contracts by the government attests to the strong and necessary presence of government
in private transactions. 8 The plea by free-marketers and
their ilk that government should stay out of our lives that the state that governs least is the state that governs
best - is as contradictory as it is disingenuous. The market is one instrument of central planning; it is not an absence of constraints, but a particular set of government
sanctioned constraints.2" Property and contract are creatures of the state and support for these allocative regimes
is neither more nor less politically neutral or activist than
opposition to them. The question is not whether government should intervene, but when and how it should regulate the affairs of its constituent citizens.
The efforts by U.S. courts to administer this central,
but illusive public-private distinction are both troubled
and troubling. Two examples will have to suffice. It is
widely acknowledged that "so far as the Constitution
goes, a private person may engage in any racial discrimination he wants."2 5 Constitutional imperatives apply only
to state actions. In free speech doctrine, this adherence to
the public-private distinction has raised two pressing
questions: the extent to which the state can refuse to
make its own facilities available to the public for speech
purposes (when can the state act as a private body?) and
the extent to which private persons must allow their
property to be used by the public for speech purposes
(when must a private person be treated like the state?).
In the first instance, while the courts have held that
traditional forums like streets and parks are available for
speech purposes,2 6 they have tried to develop a doctrine
that gives limited access to public property where the ex-

22. This insight was explicitly recognized by even the U.S.
courts almost 60 years ago, but they have failed to act on it.
See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Since then, it
seems to have been conveniently and selectively overlooked. The
modern ramifications of this insight for constitutional and administrative law are fully developed in Hutchinson and Petter,
Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of The Charter,
38 U. TOR. L.J. 278 (1988), and Hutchinson, Mice Under A
Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Administrative State, 39 U.
TOR. L.J. (forthcoming, 1989).
23. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci Q. 470 (1923); and Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
24. See C. Lindblom, POLITICS AND MARKETS 93-106
(1977).

25. Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 452
U.S. 105, 128 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
26. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).

ercise of speech rights is compatible with normal activity
at normal times.2 7 The resulting 'public forum' doctrine
is a bewildering amalgam of half-distinctions and semisimilarities: courts gravitate between generous and narrow interpretations of so-called public forums. 8
The doctrinal confusion has primarily flowed from the
tension between the public-private distinction and the
courts' insistence that "the [government], no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for use to which it is lawfully
dedicated."' 9 This means, of course, that the government's obligations depend on what the powers of a private property owner are. This turns into a circular argument. The rights of private property owners are
determined by the extent to which their property is or is
not being used for public purposes; government property
being used for non-public purposes can be regulated in
line with the powers of private property owners. In short,
each is defined and determined in terms of the other. The
availability of public property for speech activities is conditional on the unavailability of private property for
speech activities which is itself dependent on the availa-

The market is one instrument of central
planning; it is not an absence of constraints, but a particularset of government sanctioned constraints.
bility of public property. Doctrinal intelligibility and determinacy are perennially elusive.
Despite the U.S. courts' vaunted reverence for the
protection of speech rights, they have only tended to enforce them outside private property: "it would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require
them to yield to the exercise of first amendment
rights."8 In rare circumstances, however, private property has been treated as being publicly held and, therefore, amenable to the exercise of speech rights. This, of
course, does not dispose of the constitutional question,
but re-directs attention to those considerations that are
relevant to the 'public' sphere. As expected though, the
public-private distinction has proved thoroughly unequal
to the task either as a general analytical tool or as an
27. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
28. See United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981); Perry Education Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators' Assoc., 460 U.S. 37 (1982); and
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 105
S.Ct. 3439 (1985). For a strong critique of these doctrinal developments and their earlier history, see L. Tribe, CONSTITUTIONAL CHbOICES 204-10 (1985), and Cass, First Amendment
Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979).

For an account of how categories like 'public forum' and 'nonpublic-forum' can be manipulated to serve differing objectives
and interests, see Dienes, The Trashing of The Public Forum:
Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 109 (1986).
29. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
30. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
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ideological screen. As with the 'public forum' doctrine,
the courts have vacillated in their willingness to turn private property into public property. This is especially evident in dealing with shopping centers where the confusion of legal doctrine is regularly re-affirmed in futile
efforts by the courts to whip it into intelligible or determinable shape.31
Rather than grasp the political nettle by discarding
the public-private distinction, the courts continue to
reach substantive answers by asking analytical questions.
However, whichever analytical approach is followed, social facts intrude on such a conceptual exercise. For instance, it takes little reflection to realize that the opportunity to use shopping centers to disseminate information
or ideas is a more effective exercise of speech than standing on a street corner. Being a relatively inexpensive way
of reaching large numbers of people, the prohibition of
such access works an unequal disadvantage to the poor.
The wealthy can use more effective, and arguably more
intrusive, mediums - beaming TV messages directly
into people's homes. Also, it must be remembered that
government property is the only property to which many
people can get access. Consequently, any curtailment of
speech activities on such property has a disproportionately negative impact on the poor and their capacity to
engage in public debate."
IV. THE LIBERAL IMPASSE
Fiss, of course, is not insensitive to all this. The impetus for much of his work comes from a genuine desire to
rectify this state of socio-legal affairs and to guarantee
that people possess real, and not simply abstract, freedom
and equality.3 3 He is insistent that, by ignoring the pervasive impact of private power on individual citizens and
concentrating on abuses of public power, the law insulates vast sectors of the social hierarchy from official
scrutiny and public accountability. The constructive consequence of Fiss' critique is the recommendation that
constitutional norms ought to apply to all facets of life in
the United States; private bureaucracies must not be allowed to hold the democratic community to political
ransom.
Yet, for all the intuitive appeal of his critique, Fiss
fails to appreciate its full implications. He has thrown
himself on the horns of a painful dilemma. Unless he is
prepared to develop a substantive vision of distributive
justice, no template will exist against which to measure
31. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Food
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, (cited in note 30); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424

U.S. 507 (1976); and Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1981). For a thorough-going critique of these
cases, see Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in D. Kairys ed., THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1-9 (1982).

Unmindful of U.S. doctrine's congenital incoherence, Canadian courts seem enthusiastic to emulate the judicial efforts of
their southern neighbors. In the leading case, the Supreme
Court of Canada accepted that picketing could be a protected
form of expression, but held that private employers fell outside
if the reach of the Charter. See Retail, Wholesale and Dept.
Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174.
Further, even where government property is involved, the courts
.ngage in an U.S.-style balancing process under cover of the

the social value of any particular act or state of affairs.
Contrary to what Fiss believes, a substantive value not
only "makes life easier," but is essential.3 Without such
a measure, the result is only a desultory ad-hockery.
However, if he does develop such a vision, he will have
abandoned his self-confessed commitment to liberalism
and its neutrality toward substantive theories of 'the good
life'.
A major stumbling block for Fiss is the liberal tendency to view community as nothing more than a loose
grouping of individuals whose private preferences temporarily might happen to coincide and comprise a cluster of
common values. These shared commitments will always
be the reconciled outcome of individual choice and not, as
in a more civic depiction of political community, the context for the growth of personal identity. Accordingly, if
Fiss is to sustain his demand for an improved quality of
political dialogue, he must articulate his own conception
of what comprises a democratic standard of public
debate.
A related difficulty is that any move in this non-liberal direction would force Fiss to accept the impossibility
of a neutral or objective mode of constitutional adjudication; a conclusion that does not seem likely from the Fiss
oeuvre to date.3 5 Without clearly defined realms of public
and private activity, the traditional knit of constitutional
rights starts to unravel. If the state is implicated in all
societal activity, the question of whose entitlements are to
be protected from whose interference becomes a contested matter of political choice rather than the correct
application of abstract principle. Without a public-private distinction, constitutional protection of speech ceases
to be about the preservation or promotion of some presocial realm of individual autonomy. The liberal belief
that normative experience is exclusively a private affair
and not amenable to public evaluation will have to be
abandoned. Constitutional law will come to consist of
claims about the appropriate allocation of state powers
and social resources among citizens; human fulfillment
will take on a vital and invigorating social dimension. In
this revised understanding, neutrality - or, as Fiss prefers to put it, "bounded objectivity" 6 - ceases to be a
plausible characteristic or an attainable goal of judicial
review. Judicial decision-making will be seen as the political and visionary act that it always was.
For instance, in the archetypal dispute between the
person who wants to use property to speak, pamphleteer
or picket and the property owner who wants to exclude
Charter's s.1. See Committee For the Commonwealth of Canada v. The Queen in Right of Canada, [1987] 36 D.L.R. (4th)
501.
32. For a development of this theme, see Hutchinson and
Jones, Wheeler-Dealing:An Essay on Law, Politics and Speech,
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34. Speech at 1412 (cited in note 8).
35. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739 (1982), and The Death of The Law?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1986).

36. Objectivity and Interpretation, id. at 745.
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such activities, liberals resort to the rhetoric of individual
rights. Yet, lacking the support of the mythical publicprivate distinction, any efforts to reach coherent or convincing resolutions of competing claims by individuals become impossible without addressing the deep and disturbing normative difficulties that such disputes raise.
Rights-talk only masks these choices; it cannot resolve
them.37 The competing claims of speaker and property
owner can be framed in terms of rights, but their resolution will always depend upon an inextricable combination
of constitutional principle and political power. A serious
effort to confront this difficult conjunction demands a
thorough reassessment of society's deepest commitments
and operative assumptions. While these questions do not
lend themselves to easy answers under any theory or
practice of social justice, liberalism provides no theoretical framework for even understanding let alone resolving,
distributional issues of this kind. It requires the very conception of substantive good that it so proudly eschews,
but so badly needs.
V. DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE
What would a non-liberal theory look like? What is
the alternative to a liberal approach to free speech? Unfortunately, the position of radical theorists on free
speech has never been entirely satisfactory. Too often, it
has allowed liberals to take the high ground and
presented its own position as a vulnerable combination of
moral ambivalence and political naivete. By countenancing a dangerous romance with state regulation, radicals
have raised the Orwellian specter of enforced dogma and
official conformity. Good intentions have proved insufficient to bridge the gap between democratic ideals and
practical realities. The major difficulty of the left has
been the willingness to accept the liberal account of the
problem to be solved and to work within its limiting
framework. As Fiss' work shows, liberal starting-points
inevitably lead to liberal end-results. In all its different
threads and strands, 8 the contemporary tapestry of free
speech draws on a very inadequate set of premises and
assumptions; it has an impoverished view of human personality and language and, most importantly, the crucial
relation between the two. Before the left can offer a viable theory of free speech, it must re-think the problem
from the ground up: the nature of 'freedom' and 'speech'
must be constructed afresh.
The first step in this direction is to understand the
mutually constituting dialectic between the individual
and discourse, which liberalism fails to take seriously and
which forms the practical basis of the dialogic community. Under the liberal theory of freedom, the approach
to free speech is premised on a social world compromising an aggregation of distinct individuals with a set of
37. See Hutchinson and Monahan, The Rights Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1477 (1984); and
Petter and Hutchinson, Conflicting Rights: An Essay on Constitutional Legitimacy, 23 U.B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming, 1989).
38. See E. Barendt, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-23 (1985).
39. See L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578

(1978), and T. Emerson,
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6-7 (1979). For a 'sophisticated' example of the pre-

pre-social preferences and values. Social interaction provides opportunities to satisfy better their given preferences and to achieve a desirable level of self-fulfillment:
shared values are a possible product of a just society, but
not a condition for its existence.3 9 Within liberal society,
language is understood as a neutral medium that is available to all and that stands independently of the ideas and
world it is intended to convey or depict; it is the postperson delivering a letter or the librarian handing out a
book. 0 In its various renderings, the liberal objective is to
facilitate this intellectual economy of exchange and to enhance individual choice and self-determination. Consequently, the pillars of liberal free speech are the private
individual with "different and indeed incommensurable
and irreconcilable conceptions of the good"4 and the
transparency of language as a public medium through
which to communicate them.
The liberal view presents a falsely dichotomous view
of the world, apart from the naive failure of most scholars to recognize its scope for domination. For the modern
liberal, the challenge is to steer a middle course between
the extreme images of an heroic Rodinesque individual
and an overbearing Stalinesque state; people must stand
free and alone or else risk being enslaved to a hostile
community. Emancipation is suspended in the space between a public instrumentalism and an esoteric privatism.
As Fiss' writing illustrates, liberal theory ceaselessly vacillates in this posture and is forever seeking to mediate
the competing influences of the government as a threat to
and guarantor of individual freedom."2
For instance, liberals seem to adopt simultaneously
the contradictory position that language can be a neutral
conduit in which speakers can fully and freely express
themselves and also that language can be a potent vehicle
for the indoctrination of some speakers by others. The
particular stance adopted will usually depend upon the
identity of the speaker. When spoken by self-possessed
individuals, language will be considered a transparent
medium; when uttered by government, it will more often
be treated as a suspect tool. The reality is more nuanced
and less polarized: government is occasionally the voice
of the muted many against the voluble few, and monied
voices often speak in the language of dissemblance. Unfortunately, the danger of discursive socialization or indoctrination is not uniquely attributable to the actions of
government; power is not the sole preserve of the government, but is distributed also among an elite corporate
sector.4 To check the abuse of dialogic power, there
must be a critical shift of analysis from its sources and
quantity to its consequences and quality.
The inability of liberalism to make this shift arises
from its limited view of language. Liberals are unable to
formed liberal individual, see R. Dworkin, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204 (1984).
40. See T. Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 101 (C.B. MacPherson ed.
1968), and J. Locke, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Bk.3, ch.2 (A. Pringle-Pattison ed. 1924).
41. Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in S.
McMurrin ed., LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND LAW 17 (1987).
42. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979).
43. See Hutchinson, Mice Under a Chair (cited in note 22).
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grasp the dialectical and dialogic nature of individual
identity and social action. The public resources of language and the private thoughts of speakers converge and
conflict in mutually sustaining and transforming patterns. Contrary to the liberal view, language is not a
transparency through which the world is observed nor a
catalogue of labels to be attached to the appropriate contents of the world. There is no form of pure communication that merely represents instead of creating. Language
is a social medium: it shapes society and its individuals as
they work to reshape it. No one is free to describe the
world as they wish; they are always already constrained
by the prevailing ways of speaking, by the package of
foundational beliefs and assumptions about reality and
the individual's place within it. The world, and our ideas
about it, take on meaning within historically specific
modes of communication. A society's resources for conversation determine not only the knowledge at its disposal, but also its very ways of knowing. By using language,
we accept its unspoken values and commitments. As
Umberto 4Eco put it, "the subject is spoken by
language."
As such, discourse constitutes and creates reality,
both personal and collective, as much as it is constituted
by society. Social reality is constantly being negotiated
and constructed, re-negotiated and re-constructed. Language is not a system of static symbols, but is a form of
social action and history-making. To acquire and exercise
a language is to engage in the most profound of political
acts. As much feminist literature shows, to name the
world is to control it.4 6 Law manages to impose a largely
masculinist construction on social life, and thereby silences and marginalizes alternative ways of understanding and being in the world. As a particular mode of authoritative 46discourse, law inscribes its intrinsic values on
the world.
Consequently, the need to understand dialogue - the
discursive interactions between individuals - as the crucible of social action in which individuals actually constitute and re-constitute themselves and others is paramount. The adoption of such a dialectical view of the
relations between language, social action and individual
intentionality shifts attention from individuals to the circumstances of their dialogic interactions. The challenge

44. Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE at
45 (cited in note 13).
45. See, for example, Spender, MAN-MADE LANGUAGE
(cited in note 12).
46. See Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law - What
Language Can We Use?, ** NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming, 1989).

47. R. Bernstein,
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163 (1983).
48. Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction
of Ethics, 133 U. PENN. L. REV. 291, 378 (1985). See also

becomes twofold: to ensure that the quality of dialogue is
sufficiently open and fluid so that people might confront
each other in the routine practices of daily life as equal
participants and, also, that it is sufficiently shared and
certain to protect people from its unscrupulous manipulation. It is only by establishing such conditions of face-toface intimacy and engaging in such dialogic encounters
that we will reach and share satisfactory knowledge and
truths. A profound connection exists between conversation and the transformative possibilities of individual
identity. However, conversation and connection become
important and valuable in themselves and not simply as a
means to the personal end of self-expression: they are the
pith and substance of social life.
Moreover, the vision of a dialogic community "mutual understanding, respect, a willingness to listen
and to risk one's opinions and prejudices, a mutual seeking of the correctness of what is said"'4 - provides concrete guidance to recognize and rectify the prevailing circumstances of social power. Conversation is inimical to
hierarchy; it is always critical and challenging, and allows us to create our own conceptions of meaning and
rationality, rather than uncover an independent criterion
of rationality or objective foundations. Meaning and normative standards will be created and criticized in mutual
debate, but will make no claim to universal validity. It
will, for example, oblige and empower people to wrest
control of responsible decision-making from the technical
experts, like lawyers and bureaucrats. Through conversation, criticism can be intelligible, engaged, constructive
and authoritative: "we are not left with a nothingness but
with our affirmative ability to speak about human things
in a human voice."'48 Each citizen is bound by their acceptance of the contingent, yet real, status of their own
conversation and its intrinsic dynamic.
The liberal campaign for free speech ought not to be
undervalued; its solicitude for the interests of individual
speakers against unwarranted state interference is of
great significance. The view of rights "as tools to express
and strengthen community,""' however, underestimates
the extent to which 'rights talk' is an inherently confining, individualistic and one-dimensional mode of dialogic
engagement. Legal adjudication becomes a truncated
conversation that operates within an institutional framework of coercive and normative violence.
The new dialogic community would focus as much on
the interactive conditions of human development as on
the interacting individuals. It would replace the individualistic notion of freedom of speech with a notion of freedom as part of a community; freedom becomes a facilita-

Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 33 (1986). For an excellent introduction to the epistemological implications of a dialogic ethic, see E. Simpson ed.,
ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM AND PRACTICAL REASONING (1987).
49. Minow, Interpreting Rights, 96 YALE L. J. 1860, 1862
(1986). See also M.S. Ball, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW,
METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY (1985), and J.B. White, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
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tion and mediation of engaged conversations." Within
such an ethic, people are recognized as being socially situated, but not socially saturated. Freedom is no longer
associated with a lack of constraint. There is never a situation of 'no constraints,' only an historical dialectic of
openings and closings: the issue is which constraints, not
whether some or none. The individual does not precede
social encounters, but takes on substance within them.
Freedom does not stand in opposition to community, but
only exists within communities. Social worth and self-esteem are embedded in and nourished by affective affiliations; "solidarity is the social [side] of love."" 1
Solidarity in the dialogic community would not, however, be emphasized to the point that it becomes restrictive. To live in a community need not mean to experience
life as forced march in strict formation; that is one conception of community, but it is not the only or best one.
In place of order, rank and stability, there should be a
fluid, participatory and egalitarian vision of community
in which conflict and disagreement are facilitative of its
enduring value. 5 2 Such a vision will embrace difference
as a celebration of individuality and avoid a stultifying
levelling that legislates an homogeneous 'other' against
which people are encouraged to define and measure
themselves.
A progressive vision of democratic society eschews a
debilitating anomie and a chilling sameness. It focuses on
the liberating potential of interpersonal relations. By
thinking about and understanding our personal and social
lives as complex and overlapping accumulations of such
relations, we might be better able to effect a proper accomplishment of the democratic ideal. An acceptance of
such interdependence helps us come to terms with our
vulnerability to and dependence on others as well as our
commitment to and responsibility for others. With such
an approach, the notions of autonomy and solidarity can
be better and differently understood: criticism and commitment, innovation and connection can be mutually supported. At the heart of this enterprise is the understanding that self-definition is a function of intersubjective
experience; it is the relation and not the relating entities
that should be protected and nurtured. It is as Carol Gil-

50. In advocating this dialogic politics, there are obviously
close comparisons to Jurgen Habermas' "ideal-speech situation"
and Richard Rorty's "continuing conversation of mankind." See
J. Habermas, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY (1971) and LECRISIS (1975),
THE MIRROR OF NATURE
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(1979), and CONTINGENCY, IRONY,

(1989). However, there are very significant
differences between my position and their's. Mine is more selfAND SOLIDARITY

consciously political and historical in design and ambition. I envisage a much greater contextualization of conversation so that

actual people speak in specific situations, address the politics of
their socio-historical situation and give tangible meaning to democracy in their own lives. The articulation and defense of
these similarities and differences deserve an essay of its own.
51. R. Unger, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 206 (1976).

ligan describes, "a world comprised of relationships
rather than of people standing alone, a world that coheres
through human connection." 5
CONVERSATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
By re-thinking and re-orienting free speech based on
the dialogic theory, it becomes possible to go beyond the
predictable and stereotyped terms of the contemporary
debate. The theory of dialogue goes beyond Dworkin's
and
autonomy 5
speaker
with
pre-occupation
Meiklejohn's functional concentration on audience interests.55 Under this theory, value is placed on the dialogue
itself, the interaction between people which leads to understanding, and to a new community which is responsive
to the needs of everyone in that community. Dialogue
turns us away from liberal notions of individual freedom,
whether singly or aggregately expressed, and points us towards the democratic activities of associational individuals. In order to promote the equality between participants
necessary for an effective dialogue, the state will have to
intervene, and the intervention will be based on the value
of dialogue itself. The state ought not to be in opposition
to the citizenry, but must become an institutional venue
through which citizens struggle to reach a common good.
In a democracy, there is more than dialogue between the
state and its citizens. When government speaks, it ought
to be the reverberated outcome of the democratic conversation between citizens.
By abandoning the stale ethical vocabulary of means
and ends, a concern with the formal conditions for conversational encounters embodies a substantive relationship between speakers that is important in and for itself.
Within a dialogic community, freedom would not be understood as the liberal notion of a splendid, but desolate
isolation in which the right to soliloquize might be the
extent of freedom. Nor would it be understood as a stateenforced conformity ,inwhich the right to hear another's
monologue might exhaust freedom, the danger of a communitarian model. In contrast, the regulative ideal of dialogue incorporates a right to hear, to be heard and to be
answered. The goal is to establish and maintain the social
conditions for open-ended, continuing and meaningful
VI.
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conversations in which people emerge as equals. In place
of the traditional liberal reliance on individual rights to
free speech, a dialogic community would rely on Ungerian-style social entitlements to open discourse."
Although a reliance on dialogue is richly suggestive in
reorganizing the doctrine and practice of 'free speech', it
is important that it not be treated as an abstract ideal
from which a series of pat positions on the traditional
range of hard cases can be extrapolated. In contrast to
the pseudo-exchanges of a liberal democratic republic,5"
dialogue generates and reinforces its own ethic. It not
only offers a substantive measure for judging the quality
of political life, it also provides the means by which to
bridge the normative gap between general ideals and
practical application. Conversation is the embodiment of
the procedural and substantive goals that a democratic
society can aspire to and achieve; it improves and
strengthens itself through constant practice and usage.
One crucial consequence of such a dialogic understanding
will be a reordering of the hard cases to be confronted

Dialogue demands more than the existence of speech somewhere by someone.
It demands a realistic opportunity for
voices that have been previously silenced
to be heard and responded to by others.
and resolved by the participants in the dialogue. The dialogic process recognizes that there are no final or right
answers, but different options whose exercise and appropriateness will depend on the particular problem and its
socio-political/socio-economic context.
A commitment to 'democratic conversation' requires a
changing and changeable mix of interventions and abstentions on the part of the state, in order to equalize the
ability of the citizens of the community to participate in
the debate. This dialogic theory eschews sweeping statements about whether collectively sanctioned interference
of the state in media activities is desirable. While a mandated entitlement of public access to large-scale media
might be necessary, the universal availability of access to
fringe publications would be self-defeating. Access by the
powerful to the small presses of the relatively powerless
threatens to replicate the existing imbalance and stymie
the development of a diversely democratic culture. A concern for dialogue obliges us to reconsider the meaning
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and operation of 'censorship'. It forces an acknowledgement that harm results not simply from the silencing of
certain voices, but also in allowing certain voices to dominate and operate a virtual monologue. A fully developed
'right to dialogue' would combine active steps to bring in
previously stilled voices and positive moves to diminish
the stentorian voices that presently dominate. Dialogue
demands more than the existence of speech somewhere
by someone; the dialogic forum is limited and finite in its
economic and discursive dimensions. It demands a realistic opportunity for voices that have been previously silenced to be heard and responded to by others.
Democratic conversation requires an abandonment of
the public-private distinction. This does not mean that
everything becomes public and that the individual loses
all sense of privacy or personal autonomy. However,
abandonment does mean that we will have to decide democratically on those moments and activities when societyat-large, through the mechanism of the state, should devolve full power and authority to individuals and establish a space in which they are immune from collective
interference. This will not be a collective abdication of
responsibility for the fate of others, but will represent a
constructive affirmation of the need for everyone to be
involved in providing a positive and empowering freedom
for each citizen. 8 The decision of what areas to keep private and exempt from state interference will not be a final decision. It will be a continuing and evolving responsibility to rework and realign these publicly created and
publicly sustained occasions of privacy. It is as much of a
problem to obliterate the distinction between public and
private as it is to reify it. The challenge is to de-mystify
the distinction and recognize its artifactual character and
liberating potential; we must use it to serve democratic
ideals rather than counterfeit authority.
Threats to the democratic ideal come from many different sources. At times, government will be the problem
and a strong and 'private' media will be the solution. The
Spycatcher debacle in England and the law lords' pathetic ruling is an obvious example."9 Here, the British
government sought an injunction to prevent the publication by newspapers of a security service officer's memoir
on the ground that it threatened national security and
was in breach of his life-long obligation of confidentiality.
At the time, the book was available for import and was
being sold in Britain. Notwithstanding this, the House of
Lords held that the interests of national security outweighed freedom of speech. For the majority, the pivotal
issue was "a conflict between the right of the public to be
protected by the security service and the right of the pub-

58. This discussion assumes that the political process functions at a greater level of democratic integrity than is presently
the case. Nevertheless, "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities" is unlikely to be eradicated entirely. See U.S. v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). This
broader issue of the appropriate balance between the political
process and other governmental initiatives to counter such
prejudice is important, but beyond the scope of this article.
59. Attorney General v. Guardian, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1248.
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lic to be supplied with full information by the press." 60 It
opted for the principle of secrecy over the practice of
publicity.
At other times, the media will be the problem and
government regulation will be the solution. The Gay Alliance affair and the Supreme Court of Canada's fainthearted judgment comes to mind." In this case, a gay
rights group challenged the Vancouver Sun's policy of
denying them access to the classified advertising section
of the newspaper. When forced to choose between the
equality of gays and the liberty of newspaper publishers,
the majority of the Supreme Court opted for the private
rights of a media corporation over the quality of public
services.
Accordingly, a self-conscious blend of 'private' and
4 public' initiatives is demanded
rather than an unthinking
and uncompromising allegidnce to one at the expense of
the other. By combining the realm of the 'public' and the
'private' and respecting both, the dialogic community
takes the strengths from liberalism and communitarianism, without being trapped by their weaknesses. This substantial and perpetual undertaking is the strength of the
dialogic community, and will lead to a dialogue in which
all citizens participate as an integral part of the democratic system.
VII. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The central role of dialogue in a participatory democratic society can be applied in the area of 'commercial
speech'. The debate over the constitutionality of restricting commercial speech has long occupied the energy and
imagination of United States jurists.62 The issue received
the first contribution from the Supreme Court of Canada
in a recent decision under the new Charter of Rights.
The complicated and volatile case of Chaussure Brown's
Inc. v. Quebec"8 involved a challenge by shopkeepers to
Quebec legislation that required all signs and advertising
to be in French only. The Supreme Court struck down
the legislation as offending the Charter's guarantee under
s.2(b) that "everyone has ...

freedom of thought, belief,

opinion and expression." It recognized as a general principle that language was not merely a medium of expression; it was "a means by which a people may express its
cultural identity [and] by which the individual expresses
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The Court held that, under the limiting provision of s.1, it
would be acceptable to require that all signs be in French, albeit not exclusively so, and that French be more prominent than
any other language. The province refused to accept this a pparent compromise. It legislated that all outside signs must be in
French only, but that bilingual signs would be acceptable inside
premises. Quebec exercised its right under s.33 of the Charter
to exempt the legislation from constitutional scrutiny. Needless
to say, this caused a political and legal furor throughout
Canada.
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his or her personal identity and sense of individuality." 4
Explicitly following U.S. jurisprudence,6 5 the Court concluded that, as commercial speech "plays a significant
role in enabling individuals to make informed economic
choices, an important aspect of individual self-fulfillment
and personal autonomy," it deserved constitutional
protection."
The Supreme Court's decision in Chaussure offers an
excellent focus for the deconstructive and reconstructive
themes of the transformative program of dialogic democracy. The matters alluded to by the Court - the constitutive character of language and the importance of informed choice - are indeed crucial elements in a
democratic society and must be treated with solicitous attention. Yet, for these very same reasons, commercial

speech is thoroughly undeserving of constitutional protection and should be democratically regulated. By according it a privileged status in the public discourse of democratic society, courts jeopardize the likelihood of
informed choice and the enhancement of individual identity and encourage the dilution of language as a form of
social action. It must be recognized that the quality of
public discourse intimately shapes individual choice, as
well as the shared meanings which protect people from
the manipulation of language or expose them to its worst
abuses.
The project of dialogic democracy requires an acknowledgment of the substantive value of public discourse as an expression of power. While the world of the
sixteenth century may have been "a stage,/ And all the
men and women merely players,"6 " all the world of the
late twentieth century is an advertisement and all the
men and women merely consumers in the sprawling marketplace; life mimics advertisements. It is not simply that
there is a barrage of information and images on how we
should look, act, eat and think, but that advertising represents a cumulative projection of a particular definition
of reality and vision of 'the good life': "Coke - Taste
The Feeling" or "Simpson's is The Store For Your Life."
Advertising does not so much concern the product being
marketed as the molding of the product's targeted consumer in the advertisers' image; it is not what is right
about the product, but what is wrong with the buyer."
The effect of such a commercially saturated atmo-
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sphere is to trivialize and impoverish democratic politics.
Public discourse becomes hostage to economics and begins to dance to, instead of call, the economic tune; it is
thoroughly infiltrated by the economic mind-set and attuned to its interests. People think of themselves primarily as consumers rather than citizens. The middle-class
weaknesses of ostentation and envy are exploited; yuppiedom becomes its own political credo and lifestyle.
Under the aegis of advertising, electoral politics is eviscerated and reduced to a hollow spectacle; form triumphs

People think of themselves primarily as
consumers rather than citizens.
over substance by converting it into its own empty reflection. As the package has become more significant than
the product, so politicians' images are more important
than their ideas. Campaigns are designed to exude credibility in which postures of leadership are mistaken for
leadership. Rhetoric replaces vision and slogans act as a
surrogate for debate; there is no real discussion as to the
substantive merits of any proposed program. As in advertisements, so in politics - the glib not only succeed over
the good, but the medium ensures that only the photogenic take part. The message is the medium.6"
For the most part, commercial speech comes from
corporations. The current legal system protects corporate
commercial speech through the fictions that corporations
are people and that corporations are private. People
speak, corporations do not; they are the artificial mouthpieces of accumulated power. As Wallace Stevens put it,
"To say more than humans with a human voice,/ That
cannot be; to say human things with more than human
voice, that also cannot be;/ To speak humanly from the
height or depth of human things, that is acutest
speech."70° The general extension of constitutional rights
to corporations underscores the constitutive relation between discourse, identity and social reality; corporations
only acquire a meaningful existence and identity within
the language of law. They exist only by dint of the legal
imagination. Through the sanctioning by Chaussure and
its predecessors of the idea that economic fictions are
rights-carrying entities at least as deserving of protection
and concern as human beings, law constitutes a particular social and normative reality.
Under the aegis of the public-private distinction, corporations are treated as private actors, separate from and
in opposition to the State.71 The major effects of this
traditional way of thinking are twofold. By treating cor69. See S. Ewen, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS
OF STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (1988). The impact of
the mass media in shaping the political process in the image of
commercial consumption is well documented. See, for example,
D. Lazert ed., AMERICAN MEDIA AND MASS CULTURE: LEFT
PERSPECTIVES (1987); and E. Herman and N. Chomsky, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS
MEDIA (1988). An early sighting of the commercial packaging
of politics is T. White, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT (1964).

porations as separate from the state, it overlooks the important influence that corporations exert over government
policy and the economy through lobbying, campaign financing, agency capture, media control, shared personnel
and economic pressure. 7 Also, by positing corporations
as having a similar status as citizens, it ignores the exercise of enormous power by corporations over the lives of
citizens. From McDonald's to General Motors and Sears
to CBS, corporations are the primary loci for socio-economic decisions and policy-making; how we put food on
the table, what food we put on the table, what we pay to
put food on the table, what food we think we should put
on the table and whether we put food on the table are all
questions, for instance, that are shaped by corporations.
Each effect combines to insulate corporations from democratic regulation, ensuring that large sections of the ruling elite will remain beyond the reach of popular control
and the grasp of electoral accountability. Corporations
are the favored and bastard offspring of liberals' attachment to the public-private distinction.
In a social world in which the connection between
commerce and communication is particularly intimate,
the continued privileged status granted to corporate bodies by the state makes the state responsible for the disproportionate impact of corporate speech on social life

People speak, corporations do not; they
are the artificial mouthpieces of accumulated power.
and politics. The state cannot claim that its refusal to
regulate is a neutral act. Corporations are creatures of
the state and any redistributive consequences attributable
to corporate activity implicate the state. It is only very
rarely that corporations will act as agents of social liberation. Through corporations' willingness and ability to monopolize the technology of influence, the state is inextricably involved in the distribution of social power and the
quality of political debate. It is not only a major player in
the crucial game of influence-peddling, but its success or
failure affects the lives of the many citizens on whose behalf it plays. The state and its citizens are bound to lose,
if the state persists in pretending it is only an umpire or
spectator.
Of course, to deny constitutional protection to corporations does not dispense entirely with the problem of
commercial speech: monied persons as well as corporations can advertise." Consequently, it is the type of

70. W. Stevens, From Chocura to Its Neighbours, in THE
245 (1974).
71. See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1985), 11 D.L.R. (4th)
641; and Bellotti, (cited in note 14).
72. For a fuller account of this situation, see Hutchinson,
Mice Under a Chair (cited in note 22).
73. See, for example, Buckley and Bellotti, (cited in note
14).
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the citizenry than by its potential transgressors. The
court's decision not only insulates corporations from democratic: regulation in the public interest, but enables them
to set the terms for and dominate any debate over the
public interest in such regulation. In arguments over the
merit of advertising about tobacco, children's toys or
money-lending, the hand of corporations has been
strengthened and that of legislative representatives proportionately weakened. In an area where proof cannot be
scientific and the issue is as much about values as empirical evidence, any doubts will be resolved in favor of the
commercial interests. Moreover, if the speech privilege is
said to include the right not to speak as well as to speak

freely, the implications for commercial communication
by manufacturers and entrepreneurs are enormous. They
will be empowered to resist all but the most modest and
uncontroversial requests for the publication of basic product information.
Commercial speech, in the sense of disseminating information about products, is not a bad thing per se. A
large quantity and high quality of such advertising will
likely be a vital feature of a democratic society and economy. The crucial issue is who or what is to regulate and
monitor such activity - the citizenry and consumers at
large, through various legislative measures and regulative
agencies, or the commercial sector of the economy in the
name of the market? A commitment to dialogue has an
obvious and clear preference: the regulation of commercial speech must be placed firmly in the hands of the
democratic process and not placed beyond their reach by
the courts in the name of constitutional wisdom. " To do
otherwise would be to elevate the pursuit of profit to a
much more dignified status than it deserves and to give
the views of the wealthy too great a say in public affairs.
Without such a bold step towards legislative regulation,
the commitment to attaining a truly substantive practice
of democratic dialogue will be stillborn.
These conclusions are surely anathema to Fiss and
the Free Speech tradition, but essential to an egalitarian
democracy. The constitutional protection of commercial
speech frustrates rather than enhances democratic dialogue, individual freedom and social enrichment. It
threatens to realize a state of affairs in which corporate
"tyrants indulge in monologues over millions of solitudes." Information is a two-edged sword and more is
not always better; quality is more important than quantity. In today's social world, it is the commercial dilution
of public discourse to a distracting and anodyne patter
that is as much a threat as Big Brother. Citizens are
choking on a commercial glut of inconsequential information rather than starving on a constrained diet of official
misinformation. It is only necessary to ration the supply
of ideas and facts when people still retain the crucial capacity to be selective and care enough to exercise it. The
most effective censorship occurs through the dulling or

74. In line with this, Irwin Toy Ltd. successfully challenged
legislation which prohibited commercial advertising to persons
under 13 years of age. The Quebec Court of Appeal refused to
make any distinction between different kinds of speech. Socalled commercial speech received neither more nor less protection than political, cultural or artistic expression: "[tihe economic choices of the citizens are just as important, if not more
important, than their artistic and cultural choices." See Irwin
Toy Lid. v. A.G. of Quebec (1987), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 652
per Jacques J (emphasis added). See also Re Rocket and Royal
College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (1988), 64 O.R. (2d)
353, 376 per Cory J.A. These 'advances' in the protection of
corporate rights and freedoms are put in critical context when
set against the treatment of unions. Whereas corporations are
deemed worthy of constitutional recognition, the labor movement has received short shrift from the courts. See Reference re
Public Serice Employee Relations Act, Labour Relations Act
and Police Officers Collective Bargaining Act (1987), 38
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75. See Re Klein and The Law Society of Upper Canada
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The argument for reduced protection through a lower level of
judicial scrutiny is only a small, but insufficient concession. See
Sharpe, Commercial Expression and The Charter, 37 U. TOR.
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?, 18 OTTAWA L.
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speech as much as the identity of the speaker that must
be denied constitutional privilege. Commercial speech is
more about commerce than it is about speech and more
about profits than people. While the wealthy are as democratically worthy of a political hearing as any other,
their views are undeserving of any greater airing; the
challenge is to limit rather than underwrite the impact of
economic inequality on public debate.
. Mindful of the overwhelming presence and volume
of
commercial expression in contemporary society, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Chaussure effectively constitutionalizes the corporate strategy to (re)constitute life in
the impoverished image of the commercial imagination."4
If economic choices are so important, why would we
leave advertising to the discretion of those who stand to
benefit most from a partial disclosure of information?
Any putative 'right to know' is surely better policed by

While the wealthy are as democratically
worthy of a political hearing as any
other, their views are undeserving of any
greater airing; the challenge is to limit
rather than underwrite the impact of
economic inequality on public debate.
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trivialization of that cognitive process of discrimination."
By granting constitutional immunity to commercial
speech, we hasten this demise of democratic politics and
place social justice at the behest of corporate boardrooms
and other foyers of private power.
VIII. LASTING WORDS
The bitter irony of democracy's stunted practice is
that it has been brought about and justified in the name
of greater individual freedom. Whatever its good intentions, liberalism has been ambushed by the privileged and
political debate has begun to be held to corporate ransom. To counter this degradation of the democratic ideal,
there must be asserted a collective commitment to the enhancement of dialogue as the activity par excellence
through which people constitute and re-constitute themselves. A thoroughgoing discussion of 'free speech' is an
important place to begin. This especially includes the belated acceptance that its resolution is not a technical
matter of legal principle, but an ideological struggle over
the kind of society and individuals that people want to be.
Although talk alone will not set the world to rights, it is
as good a place as any from which to commence that
daunting but vital task. Dialogue is not simply a pre-condition for the building of the good community, but is an
integral part of the democratic good life.
It would take much more space and time than is
available in this essay to pursue the implications of 'democratic conversation' and to demonstrate its transformative potential. Accordingly, the limited aim of this essay
has been not so much to criticize Fiss' contribution, but
to expose the shortcomings of liberal theory that both inform and ultimately invalidate his thesis. The major
thrust of my arguments has been to demonstrate that,
while Fiss and other liberals are not against my reconstructive proposals, they cannot be unconditionally for
them either. I have outlined the type of theory that, if
fully developed, might be equal to Fiss' task of democratic reconstruction. Although I have run the risk of imitating the moth and liberal scholars, I hope that, by approaching free speech from a different angle and
imagining a different light, I will avoid their fate. Unfortunately, Fiss is in greater danger. He remains trapped
within the limited horizons that demarcate the liberal vision of democratic politics. He can only begin to imagine
the political possibilities that a less individualistic and
more civic ideal of constitutionalism can afford. With the
courage of his egalitarian convictions, he need do no
more (and no less) than confront his own "fainthearted[ness]" 78 and walk out into the open spaces of
democratic politics where the liberal is only one kind of
democrat and the democrat is not only one kind of
liberal.
In a community committed to democratic dialogue,
corporations and other institutions will have to be stopped
from talking at people. Instead, people will have to be
77. See Postman,
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encouraged to talk with one another. In working toward
the social and material conditions for such conversation,
much will have to be confronted and altered that is inimical to a truly just and egalitarian society. In so doing,
people will learn that conversation and debate are not
only some of the great pleasures of the good life, but that
they are also its necessities. As Michael Ignatieff so passionately and pertinently concludes:
We need justice, we need liberty, and we need as
much solidarity as can be reconciled with justice
and liberty. But we also need, as much as anything
else, language adequate to the times we live in ....

Our needs are made of words: they come to us in
speech, and they can die for lack of expression.
Without a public language to help us find our own
words, our needs will dry up in silence .

. .

. With-

out the light of language, we risk becoming strangers to our better selves. 9

at 13879. M. Ignatieff,
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141-42 (1984).

